Abstract While conservation activities are underfunded least cost. In the second part of the paper we review recent developments in order to examine how in practice almost everywhere, the gap between current expenditure and what is needed is particularly extreme in the tropics increased funding may be raised. There are many growing and novel sources of support: private philanthropy, where threatened species and habitats are most concentrated. We examine how to bridge this funding premium pricing for biodiversity-related goods via certification schemes, and the development of entirely gap. Firstly, we try to identify who in principle should pay, by comparing the spatial distribution of the costs new markets for environmental services. Despite their potential, we conclude that the principal route for meetand the benefits of tropical conservation. The immediate opportunity costs of conservation often exceed its more ing the unmet costs of tropical conservation will have to be via governments, and will inevitably require the obvious, management-related costs, and are borne largely by local communities. Conversely, we argue that the transfer of substantial resources from north to south. This will be enormously diBcult, both politically and greatest benefits of conservation derive from ecological services, and from option, existence, and bequest values;
developing world current expenditure is reckoned, roughly, to be less than one twentieth of that needed Attempts to conserve tropical nature are reaching crisis point. On the one hand, more species and more habitats (James et al., 1999a; Balmford et al., 2003; Fig. 1b) . Bridging this gap represents a major and urgent are at risk in the tropics than elsewhere, due to a combination of rapidly rising human populations, increasing challenge to those interested in tropical conservation. How can we bring about a substantial and sustained per capita consumption, and the higher densities in tropical areas of both species in general and intrinsically increase in the funds available for developing country conservation in ways that are both ethically acceptable vulnerable species with small range sizes in particular (BirdLife International, 2000; Fig. 1a ). On (with those who benefit most from conservation paying most for it), and pragmatic (with those targets the other hand, while in overall terms conserving what remains of wild nature makes striking economic sense identified being plausible sources of increased support)? Money is by no means the sole obstacle to achieving (Balmford et al., 2002) , conservation is underfunded everywhere, with the shortfall in resources needed conservation and not all money already available is used as eBciently as it could be. Nevertheless, we contend to do the job properly being particularly extreme in developing countries. For example, while developed that many opportunities for better conservation are lost through inadequate funding (see for example, Leaderworld expenditure on terrestrial reserves runs at only around one third of the estimated requirement for an Williams & Albon, 1988) and that many of the poorest and biologically richest countries are dependent on greatly increased funding for the sustained conservation of their (1997), we examine how the costs and benefits of conwe term passive costs, and which include the opportunity costs that arise when harvesting wild populations servation are presently distributed across local, national and global stakeholders. Who pays for conservation at or converting wild habitats is restricted, as well as the costs of damage by animals originating in conserved the moment, and where do diCerent types of benefit accumulate? We argue that in principle each constituency habitats. Although some active and passive costs (such as the budget for running a national parks' head oBce, should meet the necessary increases in funding in approximate proportion to the value of the benefits it or the opportunity costs to international consumers of reduced harvesting of protected species) are located at receives from conservation. In the second part we then use these insights into the distribution of conservation national or global levels, most costs are located in or near to the areas targeted by a project. The question is, benefits and current conservation spending as a context for exploring where in particular the extra investment who currently pays those costs? Considering firstly the active costs of conservation may come from. What do recent developments tell us about the scope for increased support from private programmes in developing countries, these are generally met in the main by state or national agencies and, to a donors, from business, and from taxpayers, and are there other means by which the gap between conservation lesser extent, NGOs funded by a combination of national and international level taxpayers and donors (upper row, needs and current support can be narrowed?
We do not attempt to tackle other major hurdles to Fig. 2 ). According to surveys of national protected area agencies conducted by the UNEP-World Conservation tropical conservation, such as the chronic shortage of trained conservation professionals, the need to expand Monitoring Centre in 1993 and 1995, international donors funded only c. 20% of total expenditure on developing in-country public and political support for conservation, and the need to develop institutions capable of delivercountry nature reserves (James et al., 1999b) . However, James et al. (1999b) suggest this was a substantial undering conservation benefits eCectively and equitably on the ground. These are all extremely important issues, estimate, a point confirmed by comparison with a topdown analysis of international donor investment in but are beyond our scope here. In addition, our own experience means that our focus in this essay is on proLatin America and the Caribbean from 1990 to 1997 (Castro et al., 2000b) . Castro et al. (2000) report that tected areas, particularly on land. However, while the detailed distributions of conservation costs and benefits international donors spent at least $180 million annually on protected areas in Latin America and the Caribbean will be diCerent for aquatic systems and for nonreserved land, and will vary across individual terrestrial at a time when equivalent government expenditure was probably <$150 million per year (James et al., 1999a , reserves, we believe that our overall conclusions are broadly applicable.
1999b; note that these and all other costs have been updated to year 2000 US $, and that by 'billion' and 'trillion' we mean 109 and 1012, respectively). Hence
Who in principle should pay?
Consider three groups of stakeholders (after Wells, 1992) : local people, living in or near the area targeted by a conservation intervention such as a park, the national community, which includes locally-based commercial elites but consists mainly of more distant stakeholders, and the global community of concerned individuals, businesses, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments and inter-governmental organizations. How much do each of these constituencies currently pay for conservation? 
Who pays for conservation now?
row, the area of the circles describes the approximate relative contribution of local, national and global communities to current
In addressing this question, it is helpful to think about expenditure on the direct costs of tropical reserves (estimated at two classes of cost: the immediate costs of conservation c. $750 million annually; James et al., 1999a Kremen et al., 2000) , and at an international level (through reduced tax contributions, which because of widespread rural poverty are low in absolute terms.
exploitation of species in international trade). In addition, passive costs that are locally incurred may be In contrast, we consider that local communities probably bear the brunt of the passive costs of developpartially transferred to national or, more commonly, international levels by the provision of compensation ing country conservation (lower row, Fig. 2 ) because the private benefits foregone as a result of the establishment schemes or alternative development programmes. Three other points need highlighting at this stage: of a protected area (through restrictions on harvesting wild species, lost opportunities to convert wild habitats 1. While the passive costs of conservation are often significant at the local level, they are sometimes perceived to farms or plantations, or reduced prospects of development of new infrastructure such as roads or electricity) to be even greater than they actually are (see dashed circles in Fig. 2 ) because some particularly destructive can be substantial (Wells, 1997; Balmford et al., 2002) . In Madagascar the opportunity costs of two parks to uses of natural habitats (such as blast fishing) may not be sustainable even in the short term. The opportunity villagers that harvest wild resources have been estimated at between $39 and $125 per household per year (Kramer costs of conservation are also sometimes inflated by incentive schemes which subsidise otherwise uneconomic & Sharma, 1997; Ferraro, 2001) , while in a third area abandoning slash-and-burn agriculture and harvesting habitat conversion (Myers, 1998; van Beers & de Moor, 1999; Myers & Kent, 2001 ). would cost upland households between $93 and $191 per year (Brand et al., 2002) ; these costs probably represent 2. However, the local communities most strongly aCected by the passive costs of developing country over 10% of household income (Ferraro, 2001) . In Kenya the gross opportunity costs of the country's c. 60,000 km2 conservation are generally among the poorest of the poor; it is both inequitable and impractical to expect of parks and reserves have been estimated at $270 million annually (Norton-GriBths & Southey, 1995) . For them to continue to bear these costs into the future (Bell, 1987; Wells, 1992 ; Norton-GriBths & Southey, developing countries as a whole, one upper estimate (based simplistically on the value of land in strictly 1995; Kramer & Sharma, 1997; Ferraro, 2001 ). 3. Fig. 2 is based on the current costs of existing protected areas) puts the opportunity costs of existing reserves at >$5 billion each year -approaching an order terrestrial reserves. Yet despite some successes (Bruner et al., 2001 ) many tropical protected areas are deteriorating of magnitude more than the c. $750 million currently spent by all agencies combined on meeting their direct Brandon et al., 1998; Oates, 1999; Terborgh, 1999; Terborgh et al., 2002) , and reserve costs (James et al., 1999a (James et al., , 2001 ; Table 1 ).
Most of these costs are met by local people (Bell, 1987 ; managers estimate that roughly another c. $1.5 billion is needed annually to meet the full active costs of these Wells, 1992; Kramer & Sharma, 1997; Ferraro, 2001; Brand et al., 2002) . Added to this, local communities in some reserves (James et al., 1999a (James et al., , 1999b ; Table 1 ). Added to this, total reserve extent is far below the c. 15% of land areas can bear significant costs as a result of animals area considered as a minimum safe standard for conserving a representative sample of species, habitats (IUCN, 1993 (IUCN, , 1998 . Expanding developing country reserve tunity costs (James et al., 1999a (James et al., , 2001  Given the enormous inequities in the current distriPassive bution of conservation costs, and the need to spend
Opportunity costs of existing reserves c. 5,000
a great deal more on tropical conservation if it is to
Opportunity costs of additional reserves c. 6,500
succeed, how can we substantially increase conservation investments, and do so fairly? We believe the key is harvesting to other species, and to identify new markets lie at the core of many recent attempts to simultaneously to examine the current distribution of conservation benefits, and the potential for these being increased in oCset the local opportunity costs of conservation and achieve development goals (IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1980, the future.
1991; Reynolds et al., 2001) . However, there is a growing view that while it can work in some situations, this Who benefits from conservation?
'use-it-or-lose-it' approach will frequently lead to the over-exploitation of wild resources, if not immediately, Here we consider five classes of benefits that may arise from tropical conservation: sustainable consumption of then as human populations and demands rise (Redford, 1992; Robinson, 1993; Barrett & Arcese, 1995 ; Brandon, conserved resources for food, timber and other fibres, and medicines; nature-based tourism; localized eco-1997; Kramer et al., 1997; Brandon et al., 1998; Newmark & Hough, 2000; van Schaik & Rijksen, 2002) . For this logical services such as regulation of water supply, prevention and reduction of storm and flood damage, reason we suggest that current levels of consumptive benefits from tropical reserves may not be sustainable, and erosion and sedimentation control; more widely dispersed ecological services such as nutrient and and will inevitably become lower in future, as stocks are depleted or permitted harvests are reduced (dashed climate regulation, and carbon storage; and option, existence and bequest values. Where do these benefits circles in upper row, Fig. 3 ). Nature-based tourism is also often advocated as a currently accrue, and can they expanded to better oCset the costs of conservation?
promising means of deriving substantial benefits from conservation (Boo, 1992; Goodwin, 1996; We contend that where wildlife and wildlife products are not commonly marketed the benefits are generally 2002). However, in most cases the benefits of tropical nature-based tourism accumulate largely at national greatest at the local level (top row, Fig. 3 ). However, for that subset of these products that are marketed, the and especially international levels, rather than oCsetting opportunity costs at the local level (Brandon, 1996 ; benefits at national scales can be substantial, and are generally less significant, though nevertheless important Wells, 1997 ; second row, Fig. 3 ). A study from Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal, for example, reported in some cases, at the international level. ECorts to make existing harvesting regimes sustainable, to expand that only 6% of households living nearby obtain any income directly or indirectly from the 50,000-100,000 people visiting the park each year (Bookbinder et al., 1998) . Likewise, only 0.2% of the total expenditure by tourists visiting Komodo National Park in Indonesia has until recently accrued to local villages adjacent to the park (Walpole & Goodwin, 2000) . Tourism is also extremely sensitive to periods of political instability. In central Africa, for instance, lucrative gorilla tourism in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo plummeted following civil wars (Butynski & Kalima, 1998 ) and Uganda's tourist industry has yet to recover from its collapse during Idi Amin's presidency, which ended over 20 years ago. These impacts of war can be more long-lasting than those on core conservation activities (Hart et al., 1996) . There is evident scope for the benefits of nature-based tourism to be increased, both in general (tourism is currently the world's fastest growing industry, with nature-based tourism believed to be its fastest growing sector, and through targeted eCorts to increase revenue-sharing, especially at the local level (Walpole & Goodwin, 2000; Walpole & Leader-Williams, 2001 ). Nevertheless, many 1999; . We therefore consider that
The total size of a row's circles reflects that benefit's approximate total value, relative to other benefits (from Costanza et al., 1997) .
the potential for expanding nature-based tourism and its benefits for conservation is more limited than someThey may also increase as natural habitats become scarcer, and if people become more aware of their times suggested (Boo, 1992; Goodwin, 1996;  dashed circles in second row, Fig. 3) .
natural heritage. The conservation of wild habitats can generate substantial, though commonly underappreciated, benefits So who should pay? through the provision of localized ecological services (third row, Fig. 3 ). For example, retaining forest cover Comparing these distributions of benefits and costs yields several broad insights into who ought to pay for can reduce the risks of downstream flooding, erosion and sedimentation, while maintaining dry season water tropical conservation: 1. A simple 'fortress-and-fines' approach for imposing flows through evapotranspiration and cloud interception; likewise, coral reefs and mangroves act as nurseries for conservation on local people without due compensation or opportunities for participation is, in our view, not oCshore fisheries, and absorb storm energy, thereby protecting coastal communities (for examples see: Kumari, only immoral (in suggesting that sizeable opportunity costs should be met by the rural poor), but also unwork-1994; Sathirathai, 1998; Becker, 1999; White et al., 2000; Yaron, 2001; Turner et al., 2002) . These benefits mostly able in the long-term because, as populations grow, the rising costs of enforcement would further increase accrue at the local level, although in many developing countries the provision of such services to major urban the largely unmet active costs of conservation. 2. Solutions which meet local opportunity costs centres is dependent on the maintenance of upstream forest cover (McNeely, 1988; Burgess et al., 2002; Spergel, may also fail when they rely on expanding already unsustainable resource exploitation, or on substantially 2002). At all scales the value of these services is likely to increase as human populations grow, become wealthier, increasing and redistributing income from nature-based tourism. One important exception here may be many and disperse into previously unoccupied areas near patches of intact habitat (dashed circles in third row, marine reserves, for which evidence is accumulating that the export of fish biomass to surrounding areas can Fig. 3 ).
For present purposes, dispersed ecological services commonly exceed the harvest foregone within a 'no-take' zone (Roberts & Hawkins, 2000; Roberts et al., 2002) . are those whose benefits can be enjoyed at a considerable distance from the conserved habitat. For example, 3. The unmet passive and active costs of tropical conservation will instead often have to be met from because atmospheric carbon circulates globally, the contribution of a conserved wetland or forest to carbon other benefit streams (see also Wells, 1992 (Myers, 1996; Costanza et al., 1997; Daily, 1997; Pimentel et al., 1997) , especially at the global scale, where all scales (Turner et al., 2002) . Moreover, because for some habitats the costs of conservation at the local level they contribute to the welfare of large numbers of relatively wealthy people (fourth row, Fig. 3 ). The value may exceed the local benefits, cross-subsidy between scales may sometimes be necessary (J. Kellenberg, of dispersed ecological services is likely to grow as human populations increase and per capita incomes rise pers. comm.; see Plate 1 for an example). Spreading responsibility for meeting the costs of conservation across (dashed circles).
We turn last to an array of non-use values (bottom beneficiaries should also buCer conservation activities against economic fluctuations in individual countries row, Fig. 3 ): those arising from retaining the possibility of use in the future (option values), those that describe or sectors. 4. In general, the most promising sources of increased the value of simply knowing a habitat or species is still extant (existence values), and those that derive from support will be those constituencies that already gain the most from conservation (i.e. the columns with the being able to pass on those benefits to future generations (bequest values). These values have informed traditional biggest solid circles in Fig. 3) , and those whose benefits are likely to grow most in future (i.e. those with dashed views of the relationship between people and nature in many parts of the world, but are notoriously hard circles much larger than solid circles). Looking from left to right across Fig. 3 at the relative magnitude of the to capture in monetary terms (OECD, 2002) , although their lower bounds are represented by the donations to overall benefits enjoyed by each group of stakeholders, the greatest contribution to meeting the currently unmet conservation NGOs. Again, higher average wealth and total population size mean that in absolute terms these costs of tropical conservation should come from the global community, followed by national and then local benefits are greater at national than local scales, and greatest of all at the global level. They can be expected stakeholders. Because the developed world and, to a lesser degree, urban communities of developing countries to grow as people become wealthier and more numerous. may stimulate immigration from elsewhere, increasing both costs and pressures (for examples, see Campbell and Hofer, 1995; Merlen, 1995; Oates, 1999) . But such a 'honeypot' eCect can be a problem for any scheme which seeks to address rather than ignore the passive costs of conservation, and can only be tackled through the early establishment of who does and does not have rights to compensation (Ferraro & Kramer, 1997) . Finally, mechanisms for delivering compensation need to be both equitable and eCective. Payments should reach all those incurring opportunity costs, and should probably be delivered not as a lump sum but in a continuous stream, in direct exchange for ongoing production of conservation benefits (Ferraro & Kiss, 2002; Plate 1 Lowland rice farming below upland forests in eastern Simpson, 2002) .
Madagascar. Lowland farmers will benefit if upstream forest
In summary, our cost-benefit comparison suggests clearance is reduced, because of reduced flooding and that a great deal of the increased support needed for sedimentation in their paddies. However, a contingent valuation tropical conservation should come from global stakestudy suggests lowland farmers' willingness to pay for upland conservation is far lower than the opportunity costs to upland holders, in exchange in particular for the continued farmers of abandoning slash-and-burn agriculture (Brand et al., delivery of both dispersed ecological services and exist- be how to bring these less tangible benefits to the attention of decision-makers. gain most from tropical conservation, it is only equitable and practical that they should pay the bulk of the costs
How can we bridge the gap in practice?
for it; at present they do not (see also Wells, 1992; Norton-GriBths & Southey, 1995; Kramer & Sharma, Having examined the principles of who ought to pay for tropical conservation and why, we now turn to 1997; Turner et al., 2002) .
5. Turning from columns to rows in Fig. 3 , the largest thinking about where in practice the extra funds may be raised. Of course the magnitude of the shortfall in conservation benefits accrue not, as sometimes supposed, from direct consumption or nature-based tourism, but funding means that we need to cast our net widely. We must look for increased support from local and from localized and dispersed services, and from nonuse values (see also Costanza et al., 1997) . Accordingly, national as well as global communities, via a mix of mechanisms: increased individual donations, bringing it is these benefit streams which best justify expanded support for tropical conservation, and which may be the market to bear, and expanding direct contributions from governments. most readily tapped to provide new conservation funding. However, because such benefits are by and large non-rival and non-excludable, persuading beneficiaries to Increased donations invest in conservation to secure the benefits over the longterm will commonly require government intervention.
At one end of the spectrum, increasing numbers of private individuals are joining membership NGOs 6. The idea of national and global beneficiaries of ecosystem services and existence values paying local (Fig. 4) . The rise of new, tropically-based NGOs, albeit patchy, is encouraging (although their most important communities for their continued delivery raises several potentially diBcult issues. We would argue, however, contributions may be political, educational and practical, rather than financial). At the other end of the spectrum, that most are soluble and none is unique to this model of conservation funding. For example, payment to not the last 5 years have seen a dramatic increase in the size and number of major contributions to tropical conharvest or not convert raises worries about welfare dependency. However, communities could be required servation from private individuals and foundations (for an example of a single initiative totalling $261 million, to be active in ensuring compliance with conservation objectives (Ferraro & Kiss, 2002) , and payments could see Conservation International, 2001). Likewise, large corporations, mostly, but not exclusively, involved in be in kind (for example, through the provision of clinics or schools), rather than in cash (Ferraro & Kramer, 1997) .
primary industries, have made a number of extremely significant donations in recent years (for one new $50 A related problem is that the provision of payments vation; similar payments are made by downstream water consumers in Ecuador, and by municipal authorities in El Salvador (Kiss et al., 2002; Spergel, 2002) .
More ambitious programmes are underway to try to secure funding for conservation through carbon credit schemes. These have considerable potential to generate significant sums for conserving tropical forests, particularly as developing countries generally have a comparative advantage, in being to able to achieve credible emissions reductions at far lower marginal cost than developed nations (Kiss et al., 2002; Niesten et al., 2002; Niles et al., 2002) . However, there is at present a major hurdle. Although reducing ongoing conversion of natural forests could make a large contribution towards meeting Fig. 4 Recent growth of NatureUganda, a local membership NGO. Data kindly provided by NatureUganda. lowered CO 2 emission targets agreed under the Kyoto Protocol (Malhi et al., 2002) , concerns over confirming compliance and over the validity of forest conservation million partnership, see Investing in Nature, 2003). These are welcome and encouraging moves, and it is to be as a carbon sequestration instrument mean that, at present, habitat retention is not eligible for carbon credits hoped that they in turn catalyse further contributions. Nevertheless, even these unprecedently large donations under the Clean Development Mechanism of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change can feasibly provide only a fraction of the total resources needed, and all NGOs are currently suCering from (Bonnie et al., 2002; Niles et al., 2002) .
Other means of funding conservation through paying reduced donations as a direct result of the battered stock market.
for carbon storage are possible, however. Internet-based initiatives run by organizations such as Climate Care (2003) and Future Forests (2003) enable individuals or Bringing markets to bear organizations to make voluntary payments in proportion to their carbon emissions, with revenues funding, among A broad suite of exciting new initiatives for funding conservation is also emerging from the commercial other things, tropical conservation projects. The World Bank has just launched the $100 million BioCarbon sector (Chichilinsky & Heal, 1998; Daily & Walker, 2000; Daily & Ellison, 2002; Sandor et al., 2002) . Some are Fund (World Bank, 2003) with the aim of reducing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere while reversing essentially extensions of existing markets, and operate through global-level consumers choosing to invest in land degradation and the loss of biodiversity, and improving local livelihoods in poor countries. In Costa environmentally responsible companies or paying premium prices for certified products that have been susRica a national tax on petrol has funded annual payments to landowners of c. $40 per hectare for retaining tainably harvested (see, for example, Forest Stewardship Council, 2003 , Marine Stewardship Council, 2003 and managing natural forests (Castro et al., 1998) . Since 1997, 320,000 hectares have been brought into this proAquarium Council, 2003, and Project Piaba, 2003) . Again, these developments are extremely welcome, but gramme (MacKinnon et al., 2002) . This funding base is now being expanded through contributions from hydrothey may inevitably only ever capture a fraction of the developed world market (and less of the developing electric companies for hydrological services and tourism operators for provision of biodiversity and scenic beauty world market), and their main role probably lies in the sustainable management of resources beyond reserves, (Chomitz et al., 1999; Kiss et al., 2002; see Plate 2) . rather than in financing protected areas (Hardner & Rice, 2002) .
Expanding direct government contributions Other market-based initiatives involve creating entirely new markets through which beneficiaries pay producers Despite the encouraging and significant growth in funding for conservation from private donors and markets, for the provision of ecosystem services; in many cases, the prompt for beneficiaries to pay for what they have we believe that general taxes, raised by governments, will continue to be the principle means by which tropical previously received for nothing has come from new legislation. The most developed such market is for conservation is financed, and by which the funding gap may be bridged (James et al., 2000) . Although the total watershed protection. In Colombia, Ecuador and Laos hydroelectric companies are handing over a substantial costs of eCectively conserving a representative sample of tropical wild nature are vast (of the order of $16 portion of their revenues for upstream forest conser-increases in annual US military expenditure alone. Alternatively, the necessary funding could come from eliminating just a small fraction of the c. $1-2 trillion currently spent each year on 'perverse' subsidies that simultaneously harm the environment and encourage economic ineBciency (Myers, 1998; van Beers & de Moor, 1999; Myers & Kent, 2001) ; this would have the added benefit, in many cases, of reducing pressures on remaining habitats and lowering the local opportunity costs of conservation (see above). One other possibility is for northern governments to fund conservation by raising entirely new taxes (Spergel, 2002) . One recurring suggestion is a so-called Tobin tax on the c. $2 trillion traded each day by currency speculators. A tax of 0.1-0.25% may help suppress harmful currency speculation while Plate 2 Costa Rican forests such as this deliver a range of localized raising c. $100-300 billion annually for international and dispersed services; new initiatives are now capturing some of environmental and poverty-related issues (Tobin Tax these values and making payments to land-holders who retain Initiative, 2003; Global Policy Forum, 2001 ). An unavoidnative forest cover (Castro et al., 1998; Chomitz et al., 1999;  able challenge, however, for any proposal to significantly Kiss et al., 2002; MacKinnon et al., 2002) . Photo courtesy of J. Kellenberg.
increase donor governments' expenditure on conservation in the developing world, is that, unlike military spending, perverse subsidies, or even development billion annually for terrestrial reserves, for example; James et al., 1999a James et al., , 2001 ) -they represent only a tiny aid, such a commitment would require the north-south transfer of real financial resources. The response to this proportion of global GDP or tax revenue (c. 0.05% and c. 0.2%, respectively; World Bank, 2002) . However, while challenge, of course, is to point out that such a transfer is entirely justified, given the substantial flow of donor governments do already make major contributions to tropical conservation, there is little evidence that this conservation benefits in the opposite direction (Fig. 3) . It should be noted that all countries are now commitsupport has grown significantly since the first commitments to the Global Environment Facility in the early ted to achieving the eight United Nations Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2000) . While only 1990s (Castro et al., 2000a; Horta et al., 2002; MacKinnon et al., 2002) . The Global Environment Facility has been one of these explicitly refers to the environment, the Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture and Biodiversity a major new source of financing for conservation but its remit has been extended to include land degradation framework used at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 reveals the interaction between and persistent organic pesticides with the result that the funds available for conservation and the other original biodiversity and the other Millennium Development Goals that cover poverty, hunger, health, water, sanitation, programmes must inevitably be reduced. External funding is of course complemented by sizeable co-financing education and the means of executing development (IISD, 2003) . This should mean that biodiversity receives contributions from the tropical governments themselves in addition to the provision of recurrent costs. Under more attention and is 'mainstreamed' in the course of development, especially in the productive landscape. debt-for-nature swaps, increased conservation investment can relieve developing world governments of some of their debt repayments (see Spergel, 2002 , for a recent Four final considerations review), although such initiatives could be undermined by programmes of debt relief for the poorest countries.
This review of the practicalities of meeting the gap in funding tropical conservation raises four other issues For donor governments, sizeable increases in conservation funding could be achieved through various that are crucial but cannot be dealt with at length here. 1. If the recurrent costs of conservation cannot be means. Though it may appear naïve, we believe it is worth reiterating that all conservation needs could be adequately met though resource exploitation or naturebased tourism but instead require payments to local readily met through only moderate reductions in military spending: a pertinent comparison given that environcommunities from elsewhere, those payments must be made on a recurrent, long-term, basis. While the fixed mental security is likely to be at least as important an issue over the 21st century as national security (Raven, term ''…project format is appropriate for building a bridge, constructing a dam, or even subduing an out-2002). A globally eCective conservation programme could be funded for less than President Bush's recent break of infectious disease … it is entirely inappropriate Paying for tropical conservation for conserving nature'' (Terborgh & Boza, 2002, building Towards a resolution on Wells et al., 1999; see also Janzen, 1986; Sinclair et al., 2000; Ferraro & Kiss, 2002) . Ongoing, market-based To summarize, the gaps in funding tropical conservation are enormous, and the costs of failing to do so are all payments oCer one route to recurrent funding. A second is via the establishment of conservation trust funds, too clear. At the risk of sounding fatuous, we note that developed countries alone spend $17 billion annually which may variously pay for conservation simply from the interest on their endowment, or by drawing down on petfood and $34 billion each year on slimming products. It is thus clear to us that the developed world a large capital sum over time (Spergel, 2002) . Although it can often prove diBcult to attract donors for the could fund eCective conservation in the tropics if it chose to. There are encouraging developments, across heavily front-loaded support that these schemes require, they have been successfully established in Uganda, several fronts, but an order-of-magnitude gearing-up of current support is nevertheless needed, simultaneous Malawi, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru and Mexico (MacKinnon et al., 2002) .
with better use of what we already have to assure donors that their money is making a diCerence. In our view, 2. There is a perceived gap between the funding of conservation NGOs and the funding of conservation this will be achieved only through greatly increased funding from the developed, donor countries, largely via action on the ground. Both the NGOs and donors are sensitive to this and there is a growing and its governments, coupled with greatly increased eCort put into working with global, national, and above all, unprecedented cooperation developing among the main conservation NGOs to assess the eCectiveness of their local communities to better understand and disseminate the benefits of conservation. This agenda underscores programs and thereby to improve their delivery. This requires better setting of targets, making meaningful the global benefits of tropical conservation, and our international responsibilities for meeting its costs. measurements of change, and learning from the results (Salafsky et al., 2002) . In addition a tool has been developed to assess the eCectiveness of protected areas (Hocking et al., 2000) , a version of which is being applied
